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In 2005, the Tennessee Legislature passed a law
that granted the Tennessee Department of Revenue (herei-
nafter TDOR) the authority to levy a tax on unauthorized
substances.1 This law requires drug dealers to pay a tax
based on the type and amount of unauthorized substance
they possess. 2 Following payment of the tax, the TDOR
issues the drug dealer a tax stamp that must be attached to
the "unauthorized substances to indicate payment." 3  A
drug dealer arrested for possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance, absent an affixed tax stamp, faces not only criminal
prosecution for the possession of the substance, but also an
assessment of the tax, a penalty, and interest accrued on the
unpaid tax.4 The legislative purpose of this tax is to "gen-
erate revenue for state and local law enforcement agen-
cies."
5
Opponents of illegal drug taxes fear that the imposi-
tion of these taxes infringes upon federal constitutional
rights. The most prevalent arguments arise from the taxes'
inherent problems with the rights against self-incrimination
1 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 803. A tax on narcotics may be referred to as an
"illegal drug tax," "controlled substance tax," or an "unauthorized
substance tax."
2 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2803 (2006).
3 d. § 67-4-2805.
4 d. § 67-4-2807.
5 /d. § 67-4-2801; see also id. § 67-4-2809(b)(2) (dispensing 75% of
the revenue to the local governments and the remaining 25% of the
revenue to the state's general fund).
1
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and double jeopardy. 6 A weaker argument may be made
that a person who discharges a tax obligation should have
the legal right to execute the activity associated with that
tax. 7
A Tennessee Chancery Court struck down Tennes-
see's unauthorized substance tax as unconstitutional. 8
Davidson County Chancellor Richard Dinkins ruled that
the tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the right
against self-incrimination. 9 This ruling, however, was only
applicable to Jeremy Robbins, who was arrested on federal
drug charges and then ordered to pay the unauthorized
substance tax.10 Chancellor Dinkins found that "levying
the tax and charging someone with a crime was equivalent
to double jeopardy... ," and "buying the stamps violated a
person's right to avoid self-incrimination.""I
The Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Eastern
Section also found that Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax was unconstitutional. 12  Rather than finding the tax
unconstitutional on federal constitutional grounds, the court
looked to the Tennessee Constitution.13 The Court deter-
mined that the tax was in essence a privilege tax allowable
under the Tennessee Constitution Article II, Section 28.14
6 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
... 1 ).
7 But see § 67-4-28 10.
8 Sheila Burke, Judge Overturns Illicit-Drugs Tax, THE TENNESSEAN,
July 12, 2006, at 1A.
9 Id. Chancellor Dinkins also ruled that Tennessee's unauthorized
substance tax violated substantive due process because the law was
invalid on its face. See id.
101Id.
11 Id.
12 Waters v. Chumley, No. E2006-02225-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL
2500370, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007).
13 Id. at *1.
14Id. at *2.
2
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 159
For this reason, the tax was deemed subject to the limita-
tion that it "must not be arbitrary, capricious or wholly
unreasonable." 15 Consequently, since "[t]axation of [a]
privilege is ... carried on ...under protection of the
state," 16 and the tax is levied on "an activity the Legislature
has previously declared to be a crime, not a privilege," the
court concluded the tax was "arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable .... ,,17
Taxes on unauthorized substances have not been
enacted in every state. Thus far, twenty-seven states have
at some point enacted a tax on illegal drugs. 18 State legisla-
tures that have not passed a tax on illegal drugs are now
examining the benefits of taxing narcotics. More specifi-
cally, these states are interested in the revenue raising ca-
pability of taxing the illegal drug trade. Many state
15 Id. (citing Hooten v. Carson, 209 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tenn. 1948))
16 Id. at *3 (citing Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 260
S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1924)).
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-1 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
12-651(a) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-1 (West 2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 63-4201 (2006); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/1 (West
2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-1 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §
453B (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5201 (2005); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 138.870 (West 2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2601
(West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64K § 1 (West 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 297D.01 (West 2006); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4301
(2006); NEv. REv. STAT. § 372A.070 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-113.107 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 618, § 450.1 (West
2006); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7204(17) (West 2006) (used in
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 449 A.2d 103 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) to tax illegal drugs); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-
2803 (West 2006); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.201 (Vernon 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-101 (West 2006); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 139.88
(West 2006) (found unconstitutional by State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1989)); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01D (West 1990)
(repealed 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-28.7-101 (West 2006)
(repealed 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0505 (West 2006) (repealed
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-101 (2006) (repealed 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 7-18A-1 (West 2006) (repealed 1995).
3
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legislatures have also enacted illegal drug taxes because
drug dealers acquire large sums of tax-free money. 19 Re-
gardless of the motive, illegal drug taxes provide many
states with the machinery to generate revenue on illegal
commercial activity that would otherwise be excluded from
assessment.
20
Many law-abiding, tax-paying citizens may agree
with a tax on illegal drugs because of their belief that indi-
viduals involved in the illegal drug trade should contribute
to the tax burden placed on society. Despite these opinions,
the issues that arise from taxing the illegal drug trade-the
inherent problems with constitutional safeguards and the
effectiveness of obtaining tax revenue-should cause pub-
lic apprehension.
First, this Note will provide a brief synopsis of the
evolution of illegal drug taxes and discuss Tennessee's
interest in using an illegal drug tax to assist in the war on
drugs. Next, this Note will describe, specifically, the oper-
ation of Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. In con-
clusion, this Note will examine the effects that illegal drug
taxes have on the constitutional privileges against self-
incrimination and double jeopardy, noting that the State of
Tennessee has not streamlined a collection process for its
unauthorized substance tax.
II. CREATION OF ILLEGAL DRUG TAXES
Illegal drug taxes have their origins in federal legis-
lation and the United States' authority to lay taxes and
regulate commerce. The Constitution gives the federal
government the ability "[to] lay and collect [t]axes" and
"[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States...
19 Christian D. Stewart, Double Jeopardy - State Drug Tax Statutes Go
up in Smoke: Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994), 74 NEB. L. REv. 221, 226 (1995).20Id. at 227.
4
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,,21 In 1864, Congress used this power to enact legislation
that required people involved in the business of selling
lottery tickets or liquor to obtain a license from the federal
government. 22 In the License Tax Cases, seven separate
defendants from various states contested their convictions
for non-payment of the lottery and liquor licenses. 23 The
defendants challenged whether they could be convicted for
non-payment of the lottery and liquor licenses, even though
the laws of their states prohibited these activities. 24 The
Supreme Court held that the licenses were a "mere form of
imposing a tax," and "it [was] not necessary to regard these
laws as giving such authority" to conduct these business-
es. 25 This decision provided an avenue for state legislatures
to tax illegal drugs while maintaining that payment of the
tax had no bearing on the illegality of the drug.
Years after the Supreme Court's decision in the
License Tax Cases, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of
1913.26 This law levied a tax on income from any "lawful
business. ' 27  The subsequent Revenue Act of 1916 re-
moved the word "lawful" from the previous Revenue Act.
28
The removal of the word "lawful" implied that "illegal
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI
("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.")
(emphasis added).
22 United States v. Vassar (License Tax Cases), 72 U.S. 462, 463
(1866).
23 Id. at 464.
24 Id. at 464-65.
25 Id. at 471; see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44
(1968) (noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly indicated that
the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation ....
26 Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913)
(amended 1916).
27 Id. § 2B, 38 Stat. at 167; see also Frank A. Racaniello, State Drug
Taxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 657, 658 (1992).
28 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757
(1916).
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businesses" were now required to identify themselves for
tax purposes. 29  Consequently, this Act may be read to
require people involved in the illegal drug trade to report
their income to the federal government for tax purposes.
The first federal laws that imposed a tax specifically
on narcotics were the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 191430
and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.31 These laws did not
explicitly outlaw any substances, but instead made it illegal
to transfer certain substances without payment of a tax.
32
Nevertheless, the high rate of tax imposed by these acts
may have had a profound deterring effect that likely contri-
buted to the eventual outlaw of the substances covered
under each act.
33
Although these laws may have assisted the federal
government in its growing fight with the war on drugs, the
Marijuana Tax Act was later found unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Leary v. United States.
34
The Leary decision may have initially prevented states
from enacting their own illegal drug taxes. Nonetheless,
"[i]n 1983, Arizona became the first state" to levy a tax on
illegal drugs. 35 Other states soon followed, resulting in the
29 Eric J. Dimbeck, The Supreme Court Confiscates an Unjust Weapon
Used in the "War on Drugs": Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 353, 354 (1996).30 Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(this act placed a tax on opiates and coca leaves, which are used in the
groduction of cocaine).
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-237, 50 Stat. 551 (1937)
(repealed 1970).
See id.; Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38
Stat. 785; see also Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decri-
minalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 501, 508 (1990).
33 For example, people who did not pay the marijuana tax were obli-
gated to pay $100 per ounce per transfer and $2,000 for any violation
of the act. Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-237, 50 Stat.
554-56 (repealed 1970).
34 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 53-54 (1969).
35 Christina Joyce, Expanding the War Against Drugs: Taxing Mariju-
ana and Controlled Substances, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 231
6
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present day number of twenty-seven states that have
enacted some form of an illegal drug tax.
3 6
III. TENNESSEE'S INTEREST IN ENACTING AN
ILLEGAL DRUG TAx
Senator Randy McNally (R-Oak Ridge) sponsored
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. 3 7 He "proposed
the law to take money out of the drug trade and recover
some of the cost of prosecuting and jailing drug offend-
ers., 38 His early estimates projected the legislation would
generate 3.6 million dollars per year. 39 The one-time cost
to the State of Tennessee to create the ten-person agency to
oversee the tax was 1.2 million dollars.
40
When compared to other states, Tennessee's drug
problem may be unique and slightly understated. Geo-
graphically, Tennessee touches eight states-more than any
other state in the nation. Drug trafficking often involves
the transportation of large volumes of narcotics between
many states before the product reaches its final destination.
For this reason, the flow of narcotics to and through Ten-
nessee is likely impacted by any adjacent state's drug activ-
ity.
Moreover, illegal drugs are often linked to violent
criminal activity, and Tennessee's violent crime rate ranks
(1991); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01D (West 1990)
(repealed 1997).36 d. at 231 (South Dakota and Florida enacted their statutes in 1984,
and Minnesota followed suit two years later).
37 Bonna de la Cruz, Tennessee Targets Dealers, Users with New Levy,
THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 29, 2004, at IA; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-113.107 (LexisNexis 2003).
38 Cruz, supra note 37, at 4A.39 1d. at IA.
4 Id.
7
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fifth among all states.41 Because of its location and the
violent nature of the drug trade, Tennessee has a compel-
ling interest in preventing illegal drug activity from increas-
ing within its borders. The Tennessee Legislature may be
under the assumption that a tax on narcotics could some-
how deter the illegal drug trade and at the same time, pro-
vide funding to combat its spread.
The seriousness of Tennessee's illegal drug problem
is apparent from the increasing amount of methampheta-
mine produced, distributed, and used in the state. It has
been reported that Tennessee accounts for three-fourths of
all methamphetamine lab seizures in the Southeast. 42 Ten-
nessee trails only Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri in the
number of methamphetamine lab seizures nationwide.43
Under Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax, the state
could expect large revenues from its frequent number of
methamphetamine lab seizures.
Tennessee's methamphetamine problem also causes
Tennessee taxpayers to incur additional out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Each methamphetamine lab has an estimated
cleanup cost of between $2,500 and $7,500, 44 and people
jailed for methamphetamine usage have extensive long-
term adverse health effects that are often treated while they
are in jail.45 High crime rates are also attributed to me-
thamphetamine usage. 46  Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax could be expected to offset these indirect costs
placed on Tennessee residents.





44Judd Matheny, Meth Problem Growing at a Fast Pace, TULLAHOMA
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IV. OPERATION OF TENNESSEE'S UNAUTHORIZED
SUBSTANCE TAX
Most unauthorized substance taxes are constructed
in the form of an excise tax on certain types and amounts of
illegal drugs. 47 When Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax went into effect on January 1, 2005, it became the twen-
ty-third state in the union to implement an excise tax on
illegal drugs.48  Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax
was modeled after North Carolina's controlled substance
tax.
49
Tennessee's tax is levied on unauthorized sub-
stances possessed, either actually or constructively, at vari-
ous rates.50 The tax is only applicable to drug dealers
51
who possess an unauthorized substance. 52 A drug dealer is
required to pay the tax "within forty-eight hours of coming
into possession of unauthorized substances." 53 If the tax
for the unauthorized substances is not paid within the re-
quired time, then the tax is considered delinquent, and the
dealer will suffer a penalty and accrued interest.5 4 In addi-
tion, if a drug dealer is found with an unauthorized sub-
stance lacking a tax stamp, it is presumed that the dealer
has been in possession of the substance for more than forty-
eight hours.
55
47 Cruz, supra note 37, at 1A.
48 Id. at 4A.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2802 (a)(3)(A), (B) (2006) (a dealer is
a person who actually or constructively possesses more than forty-two
and one-half grams of marijuana, seven or more grams of any other
unauthorized substances that are sold by weight, or ten or more dosage
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After the drug dealer pays the tax, the TDOR issues
tax stamps equal to the payment received in taxes.56 Next,
the drug dealer is required to indicate payment of the tax by
affixing the tax stamp to the possessed unauthorized sub-
stance. 57 Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax provides
that "information obtained pursuant to [payment of the tax]
is confidential and, unless independently obtained, may not
be used in a criminal prosecution other than ... for a viola-
tion of [the tax].'58
V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ILLEGAL DRUG
TAXES
A. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The constitutionality of taxing illegal activities was
originally reviewed by four Supreme Court cases in the late
1960s.59 The Court found in each case that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented
the imposition of sanctions from federal tax evasion of
illegal activities. Leary was the only case of the four that
involved the Fifth Amendment's use against a tax on illegal
drugs.6 1 The defendant, Timothy Leary,62 was, among
56 Id. § 67-4-2805(a).
17 Id. § 67-4-2806.
58 Id. § 67-4-2808.
59 See generally United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (illegal
activity was possession of marijuana); Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968) (illegal activity was possession of a sawed-off shotgun);
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (illegal activity was wa-
gering); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (illegal activity
was wagering).
60 Leary, 395 U.S. at 26; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100-01; Grosso, 390 U.S.
at 67; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48.
61 Leary, 395 U.S. at 16 (at issue was the Marijuana Tax of 1937 that
was later repealed due to the Court's decision).
62 Timothy Leary was a well-known drug enthusiast and one-time
Harvard professor. He is most noted for his famous saying, "turn on,
10
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other things, indicted on charges of having "knowingly
transported, concealed, and facilitated the transportation
and concealment of marihuana [sic] without having paid
the transfer tax imposed by the Marihuana [sic] Tax Act."
' 63
The pivotal issue in Leary was the construction of
the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.64 The statute required "the
taxpayer . . . 'register his name or style and his place or
places of business' at the nearest district office of the Inter-
nal Revenue Services." 65 The Court concluded that "[i]f
read according to its terms, the Marihuana [sic] Tax Act
compelled petitioner to expose himself to a 'real and appre-
ciable' risk of self-incrimination ... "66
The test for determining whether an illegal activity
tax is unconstitutional on self-incrimination grounds is
promulgated by Marchetti v. United States.67 The test con-
siders the following: "(1) whether the regulated activity is
in an area" of the law saturated with criminal statutes or
directed toward a specific group suspected of criminal
activity; (2) whether the obligation to pay the tax creates a
"real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination;" and (3)
whether the payment of the tax may be "a significant link
tune in, drop out," which was in reference to drug use. See Harry
Ransom Humanities Research Center, Timothy Leary Collection,
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/research/falleary.html.
63 Leary, 395 U.S. at 11.64 Id. at 12.
" Id. at 14.66 Id. at 16; see also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968)
(finding a statute taxing illegal firearms exposed the taxpayer to a risk
of self-incrimination); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67 (1968)
(finding a statute taxing illegal wagering exposed the taxpayer to a risk
of self-incrimination); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61
(1968) (finding a statute taxing illegal wagering exposed taxpayer to a
risk of self-incrimination).
67 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
11
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in the chain of evidence" to bring about criminal proceed-
ings or establish guilt.
68
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax satisfies the
first factor of the Marchetti test; the tax is imposed on un-
authorized substances, which carry criminal sanctions. 69 In
addition, the tax is only applicable to drug dealers, who are
a specific group suspected of criminal activity.
70
Applying the second factor of the Marchetti test,
some state courts have decided their state's illegal drug tax
is unconstitutional on the basis that the tax may compel the
disclosure of identifying information. 71 Illegal drug taxes
in other states have withstood constitutional scrutiny be-
cause courts have found safeguards that protect identifying
information from dissemination. 72 In State v. Hall,73 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the state's tax on
controlled substances unconstitutionally compelled self-
incrimination.74 The second factor of the Marchetti test
was fundamental to the court's determination. Analyzing
68 Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1988) (citing Mar-
chetti, 390 U.S. at 47-48).69 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417 (2006).
701 Id. § 67-4-2802(a)(3)(A)-(B).
71 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre, 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla.
1994) (holding that Florida's illegal drug tax violated both the Fifth
Amendment and the state constitution's right against self-
incrimination); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho 1991) (finding
that the 1989 version of Idaho's illegal drug tax violated Fifth Amend-
ment protections).
72 See, e.g., Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120, 123
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (holding that a taxpayer could not reasonably
suppose that information provided to the tax department would be
available to prosecuting authorities or establish a significant link in the
chain of evidence); State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1180, 1182-83
(Kan. 1989) (holding that Kansas' illegal drug tax prohibited the dis-
closure of information to be used against a taxpayer in any criminal
proceeding not connected to the enforcement of the tax act, unless
independently obtained).
73 State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
74Id. at 783.
12
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the second factor, the court chose to evaluate separately
"the purchase and the affix and display requirements" of
Wisconsin's controlled substance tax.
75
The purchase requirement was found to be self-
incriminating because the dealer was compelled to reveal to
the government his drug dealing status and that he pos-
sessed or intended to possess a quantity of a controlled
substance, which was usually a large amount.76 Moreover,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the purchase require-
ment, due to the "exception for 'independently obtained
information,"' allowed law enforcement to place an agent
outside locations where tax stamps were sold.77 This would
permit law enforcement to take photographs and follow
taxpayers at its option.78 Nevertheless, the court found that
the option of purchasing tax stamps by mail alleviated any
anonymity issues a taxpayer might encounter by paying the
controlled substance tax in person.
79
The affixation requirement of Wisconsin's con-
trolled substance tax presented an entirely different concern
with respect to self-incrimination. The affixation of a tax
stamp to a narcotic was deemed to demonstrate that the
dealer "knowingly and intentionally possesse[d] a particu-
lar quantity of unlawful drugs." 80 The court concluded that
this information would be available to the prosecution in
order to prove that the defendant knew the substance pos-
sessed was controlled under Wisconsin law.
81
In Hall, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin also found
that Wisconsin's controlled substance tax satisfied the final
factor of the Marchetti test. The tax was deemed to only
allow a taxpayer "protection from direct-not derivative--
" Id. at 784.76 Id. at 785.
77 Id. at 785-86.
78 Id.
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use of information obtained by the [Wisconsin Department
of Revenue] through compliance with the statute."8 2 The
court found that the tax allowed "the State to use compelled
information" to obtain investigative leads that could later
be used in criminal proceedings.
83
There are many similarities between Tennessee's
unauthorized substance tax and Wisconsin's controlled
substance tax. Much like Tennessee's tax, Wisconsin's tax
requires taxpayers to purchase tax stamps that must be
attached to an illegal drug.84 Also, Wisconsin's controlled
substance tax does not demand identifying information for
the purchase of tax stamps, but the tax does allow indepen-
dently obtained information to be used in criminal prosecu-
85tions.
In light of Hall, the second and third factors of the
Marchetti test will lead Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax to the same fate as Wisconsin's controlled sub-
stance tax. First, people who purchase unauthorized
substance tax stamps reveal their intent to distribute illegal
drugs. Moreover, the TDOR website does not state where
or how people may purchase tax stamps. 86 Upon calling
the TDOR's office, potential taxpayers find no readily
available alternative to buying tax stamps directly from the
TDOR's central office in Nashville.
The taxpayers' only option to satisfy the tax may be
to appear in person at the TDOR's central office. Nothing
in Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax prevents law
enforcement from keeping twenty-four hour surveillance of
82 Id. at 787.
83 id.
84 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2805 (2006) with Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 139.89 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
85 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2808 with Wis. STAT. ANN. §
139.91 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
86 Tennessee Department of Revenue,
http://www.state.tn.us/revenue/faqs/unauthsubfaq.htn#unauth4 (last
visited Nov. 29, 2006).
14
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the TDOR's central office. 87 Accordingly, taxpayers may
be subject to police surveillance while discharging their tax
obligation for the distribution of an unauthorized substance.
The police may subsequently use this surveillance to corro-
borate previous notions of a suspect already under investi-
gation for the distribution of illegal drugs or gain new leads
on suspects involved in the illegal drug trade.
For these reasons, taxpayers may be apprehensive
about traveling to the TDOR's central office to obtain tax
stamps. Thus, taxpayers may inquire about receiving the
tax stamps via mail. This inquiry requires taxpayers to
supply their residential addresses, their P.O. Boxes, or their
acquaintances' addresses, all of which compromise the
taxpayers' anonymity, despite the ruling in Hall. Tennes-
see's unauthorized substance act invokes no penalties that
prevent employees of the TDOR from relaying information
concerning a taxpayer to law enforcement. 88 Therefore,
any of this information could be given to law enforcement
to be used as a link to the taxpayer. Requesting the stamps
via mail would still expose the taxpayer to a risk of disclos-
ing identifying information to law enforcement.
The last factor of the Marchetti test is also satisfied
by Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax. Tennessee's
tax does not forbid the use of "independently obtained"
information in a criminal prosecution. The language of
the statute permits the state to use compelled information to
obtain investigative leads that could later be used to bring
about criminal proceedings. As a result, any information
obtained by law enforcement from surveillance or any other
"independent" method may be used in the prosecution of a
taxpayer for the possession of an unauthorized substance.
The unequivocal language of Tennessee's unautho-
rized substance tax avoids the affixation problem discussed
87 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2808 (2006).
88 See id. §§ 67-4-2801 to 2811.
89Id. § 67-4-2808.
15
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 172
in Hall. Although "knowingly" is the requisite intent to
convict a person for possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance in Tennessee, 90 Tennessee's unauthorized substance
tax provides that tax stamps may not be used in a criminal
prosecution for the possession of an unauthorized sub-
stance.91 The reader should note, however, that people who
purchase an unauthorized tax stamp would only do so if
they were aware that they possessed an unauthorized sub-
stance. Once they attach the tax stamp to the unauthorized
substance, they are admitting they know the substance they
possess is unauthorized under Tennessee law. Prosecutors
may not be able to enter tax stamps overtly into evidence,
but the prosecutors are likely to keep the unauthorized
substances in their original packaging, which could include
an affixed tax stamp. At trial, a juror may be hard pressed
to disregard inadmissible evidence that remains on admiss-
ible evidence.
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...
,92 Case law has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause
to protect against three distinct situations: (1) "a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal"; (2) "a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction";
and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense." 93
Under the latter situation, the Supreme Court has had diffi-
culty in determining what constitutes a multiple punish-
90 See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4) ("It is an offense for a defendant to kno-
wingly... [p]ossess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture,
deliver or sell the controlled substance.").
91 See id. § 67-4-2808.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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ment. In Ex parte Lange,94 in which the defendant paid a
fine and suffered imprisonment for his crime, the Supreme
Court held against the imposition of another punishment
from the same verdict because "to do so is to punish him
twice for the same offence." 95 In United States v. Halper,
96
the Court concluded monetary penalties from a civil statute
imposed after a criminal prosecution also constituted a
multiple punishment and therefore violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
97
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch98 gave the Court the opportunity to examine whether
a tax could be considered a multiple punishment under a
Double Jeopardy analysis. 99 The question before the Su-
preme Court in Kurth Ranch was "whether a tax on the
possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has im-
posed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate
the constitutional prohibition against successive punish-
ments for the same offense."
100
Although the Court found Montana's illegal drug
tax was high, neither the tax's lofty assessment nor deter-
rent purpose classified it as punishment. 1°1 No doubt ex-isted that Montana's illegal drug tax was implemented to
14 Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
95 Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
96 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
9' Id. at 449-50.
98 Dep't of Revenue of Mon. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
9 9 
Id. at 767.
'O Id. at 769. The State of Montana enacted a tax on the storage and
possession of illegal drugs and provided that the state would be able to
collect the tax after the offenders satisfied their fines and obligations.
Id. at 770 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to 123). The Mon-
tana Department of Revenue was given authority to adopt rules to
oversee the tax. Id. at 770-71. The agency promulgated rules that
required the taxpayers to pay the tax sometime after their arrests and
placed the taxpayers under no obligation to file or pay the tax unless
arrested. Id. at 771.
1' Id. at 780.
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deter the drug trade, but the Montana Department of Reve-
nue claimed, and the Court accepted, that many taxes, such
as those on cigarettes and alcohol, are high and to some
extent motivated by deterrence. 102 Nonetheless, the high
rate of Montana's illegal drug tax did "lend support to the
characterization of the [tax] as punishment," although this
factor alone was not dispositive. 103
The Court found two "unusual features" that made
Montana's illegal drug tax especially problematic with the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 104 First, the tax was shown to be
conditioned strictly on criminal activity. 105  The Court
considered this condition to be significant because it dem-
onstrated that the tax had purposes other than raising reve-
nue; the tax also had punitive and prohibitory purposes. 1
06
Second, the tax was "exceptional" because "it [was] levied
on goods that the taxpayer neither own[ed] nor possesse[d]
when the tax [was] imposed." 107 Montana's illegal drug tax
required payment of the tax only after the offender had
been arrested and displaced of the illegal drug. The Court
found "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist
and that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an un-
mistakable punitive character."'
10 8
The Kurth Ranch decision essentially employed a
three-part test to determine whether a tax is punitive and
thus infringes on an individual's right against double jeo-
pardy. The test employs the following: (1) whether the
tax's rate is high enough to make it a significant deterrent;
(2) whether the tax is conditioned on the commission of a
crime; and (3) whether the tax levies on goods the taxpayer
102 Id. at 780-81.




7 Id. at 783.
108 Id.
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no longer owns nor lawfully possesses when the tax is
assessed.
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax satisfies the
first factor of the Kurth Ranch test. The tax is imposed on
various unauthorized substances as follows: $0.40-$3.50
for each gram of marijuana depending on the type, $200 for
each gram of any controlled substance or low-street value
drug sold by weight, $50 for each ten dosage unit of any
low-street value drug that is not sold by weight, and $200
for each ten dosage unit of any other controlled substance
that is not sold by weight.109 These rates may be regarded
as high enough to sustain an argument that Tennessee's
unauthorized substance tax is a significant deterrent. For
example, Tennessee's tax enforces approximately the same
tax rate on marijuana as Montana's illegal drug tax, which
the Kurth Ranch court characterized as "a remarkably high
tax." 1
10
As aforementioned, Tennessee's unauthorized sub-
stance tax is based on North Carolina's controlled sub-
stance tax. North Carolina's model has stood firm in state
court against attacks from the second and third factors of
the Marchetti test. For example, in State v. Ballenger,
1 I
the court distinguished North Carolina's controlled sub-
stance tax from Montana's illegal drug tax by finding it
"contain[ed] neither of the 'unusual features' upon which
the Supreme Court relied in Kurth Ranch to conclude that
Montana's dangerous drug tax constituted punishment for
double jeopardy purposes."' 112 The court was persuaded by
the fact that North Carolina's tax levies an assessment
forty-eight hours after a drug dealer comes into possession
109 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2803 (2006).
110 Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780. The high end of Tennessee's tax on
marijuana imposes $3.50 per gram (or approximately $98 per ounce),
which is analogous to Montana's illegal drug tax that levied $100 per
ounce on marijuana. See id. at 780 n.17.
111 State v. Ballenger, 472 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
112 Id. at 574.
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of a controlled substance rather than imposing the tax after
the drug dealer has been apprehended by law enforce-
ment. 113  From this fact, the court inferred that the tax is
not levied on the commission of a crime, and the controlled
substance is not confiscated and destroyed before the tax
can be imposed. 
114
The Ballenger decision is unpersuasive in light of
the Kurth Ranch holding. First, North Carolina's con-
trolled substance tax is unsuccessful in circumventing the
requirement of avoiding a tax that is conditioned on the
commission of a crime. The Ballenger court fails to con-
sider North Carolina law regarding controlled sub-
stances. 115 The court neglects the fact that it is illegal for
any person to possess a controlled substance in North Caro-
lina. 116 This fact alone suffices as a violation of the Kurth
Ranch condition. A person must be in possession of a
controlled substance to be subject to North Carolina's con-
trolled substance tax.117 Thus, one could reasonably argue
that North Carolina's controlled substance tax is predicated
on the commission of a crime.
Additionally, North Carolina's controlled substance
tax may be said to violate the second "unusual feature" of
the Kurth Ranch decision. It is almost absurd to assume
that a drug dealer will satisfy an illegal drug tax before the
narcotic is seized by law enforcement. Drug dealers are
unlikely to pay the tax out of a reasonable suspicion that
the purchase, affixation, and display of a tax stamp may
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 575.
116 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2003).
117 See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
781 (1994) (noting that "the tax assessment not only hinges on the
commission of a crime" but "is also exacted only after the [potential]
taxpayer has been arrested for precise conduct that gives rise to the tax
obligation .... ).
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signify admission to a crime.11l Consequently, when law
enforcement seize the controlled substance without an
affixed stamp, the dealer, who out of fear of self-
incrimination has not paid the tax, has been disposed of and
is no longer in control of the narcotic. More importantly, it
cannot be argued that the drug dealer ever lawfully owned
the controlled substance. 119 Given that Tennessee's tax is
modeled after North Carolina's tax, it will incur the same
constitutional problem with the Double Jeopardy Clause.
VI. COLLECTING REVENUE FROM TENNESSEE'S
UNAUTHORIZED SUBSTANCE TAx
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax was con-
templated to generate millions of dollars in revenue for the
state's general fund and local and state law enforcement
agencies. 120  Since its inception in January of 2005, the
results have not been as encouraging as estimates envi-
sioned. According to the TDOR, the tax garnered only
$340,000 in its first year. 121 This figure is further diluted
by the fact that the Drug Investigation Division of the Ten-
nessee Bureau of Investigation reported that from 2005 to
the first half of 2006 it seized 5,340 grams of crack co-
caine; 111,064 grams of powder cocaine; 4,309 pounds of
bulk marijuana; 12,897 marijuana plants; 9,169 grams of
methamphetamine; 88 methamphetamine labs; and 5,912
118 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969).
119 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(3); see Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 783
(finding that the tax was levied on goods that were no longer in posses-
sion of the taxpayer and "never lawfully possessed," which gave the
drug tax "an unmistakable punitive character").
120 Cruz, supra note 37, at 4A.
121 TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REVENUE COLLECTIONS
(Dec. 2005), http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2OO5/coll2OO512.pdf;
REVENUE COLLECTIONS (June 2005),
http:l/state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200506.pdf (last visited June
15, 2006). These figures only calculate actual collections and do not
factor in assessments as a result of the tax. Id.
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dosage units of ecstasy. 122 This information also suggests
that the tax is not recovered as easily as predicted.
Notably, the state spent $1.2 million to establish the
TDOR agency that administers the unauthorized substance
tax. The yearly maintenance of this agency was projected
to cost an additional $800,000.123 Although it may be pre-
mature to evaluate the successfulness of the tax, the early
returns are definitely not consistent with initial projections.
Diminutive returns also raise questions about the
validity of the tax. Not surprisingly, only $1,300 in tax
stamps were collected in the tax's first year of existence. 124
These returns should cause concern over whether the unau-
thorized substance tax is arbitrary. If drug dealers are not
purchasing unauthorized substance tax stamps, and the tax
is only assessed and never recovered, then the presumption
may be that Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax is
clearly to punish drug dealers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax has the po-
tential to raise constitutional concerns each time it is en-
forced. Undoubtedly, the tax will come under scrutiny for
the abridgment of the Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination and double jeopardy. Additionally, Tennes-
122 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2004-
2005), at 5, http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/Info%2ODiv/Color%20-
%20TBI%2004-05%2OAnnual%2OReport.pdf (last visited June 15,
2006).
123 Cruz, supra note 37, at IA.
124 TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REVENUE COLLECTIONS
(Dec. 2005), http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200512.pdf;
REVENUE COLLECTIONS (June 2005),
http://state.tn.us/revenue/pubs/2005/coll200506.pdf (last visited Jun.
15, 2006). The purchase of $1,300 worth of tax stamps does not neces-
sarily signify that those stamps were purchased to affix to an unautho-
rized substance. Those stamps could have been purchased for other
reasons (e.g., as collector's items).
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see has not streamlined a process to recover revenue from
the tax. If the unauthorized substance tax is to remain un-
der Tennessee law, the State of Tennessee must ensure that
the tax does not have any characteristics that would lead the
general public to believe its purpose is arbitrary or abusive
of constitutional rights. Because of these concerns, the
Tennessee Legislature should reconsider the legitimacy of
Tennessee's unauthorized substance tax.
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